































The Explanatory and Predictive 
Power of Non Two-Stage-
Probability Theories of Decision 








 Working Papers  
Department of Economics  
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice  
No. 12/WP/2011 
ISSN 1827-3580 
The Working Paper Series 
is available only on line 
(www.dse.unive.it/pubblicazioni) 
For editorial correspondence, please contact: 
wp.dse@unive.it 
  Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta San Giobbe 
30121 Venice Italy 







The Explanatory and Predictive Power of Non 




John D Hey 
University of York 
 
Noemi Pace 
University of Venice 
 




Representing ambiguity in the laboratory using a Bingo Blower (which is transparent and not 
manipulable) and asking the subjects a series of allocation questions (which are more efficient 
than pairwise choice questions), we obtain data from which we can estimate by maximum 
likelihood methods (with explicit assumptions about the errors made by the subjects) a 
significant subset of the empirically relevant models of behaviour under ambiguity, and 
compare their relative explanatory and predictive abilities. Our results suggest that not all 
recent models of behaviour represent a major improvement in explanatory and predictive 
power, particularly the more theoretically sophisticated ones. 
 
Keywords 
Alpha Model, Ambiguity, Bingo Blower, Choquet Expected Utility, Contraction Model, Rank 










Address for correspondence: 
Noemi Pace 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 2349187 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349176 
e-mail: n.pace@unive.it  
This Working Paper is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 







The past decade has seen an explosion of theoretical work in the modelling of be-
haviour under ambiguity. Now it is the turn of the experimentalists to investigate the
empirical validity of these theories. That is the primary purpose of this paper: to pro-
vide experimental evidence which investigates the empirical performance of theories of
behaviour under ambiguity. Speci￿cally, we complement a growing experimental litera-
ture, and, in particular, add to the work of, Abdellaoui et al (2011), Halevy (2007), Ahn
et al (2010) and Hey et al (2010), though our detailed objectives, methods and results
differ in many respects substantially from theirs.
In essence, all these papers (and others) are aimed at the same fundamental objective:
to discover which of the many theories of behaviour under ambiguity are empirically
most appealing. However our work differs from these earlier works in terms of: (1)
the representation of ambiguity (except for Hey et al); (2) in terms of the experimental
design (except for Ahn et al); (3) in terms of the theories being explored; and (4) the
econometric methods (except for Hey et al).
Ambiguity is represented in different ways in the experiments on which these different
papers were based. Ambiguity is understood as a situation in which probabilities do
not exist or the decision-maker does not know the actual probabilities. Both Halevy and
Abdellaouietaluseasoneoftheirrepresentationsthetraditional’EllsbergUrn’: subjects
aretoldwhatobjectsareintheurnbutarenottoldthequantitiesofeachobject, sothatthe
probability of drawing any particular object can not be known by the subject. Abdellaoui
et al, given that their objective is to examine the impact of different sources of ambiguity,
also consider other sources (changes in the French Stock Index, the temperature in Paris,
and the temperature at some randomly drawn remote country - all on a particular day).
Ahn et al’s representation is simply not to tell the subjects what the precise probability
of two of the three possible outcomes was; this is a sort of continuous Ellsberg Urn and
inevitably suffers from the usual problem that the subjects may simply consider it as
the ’suspicious urn’. In contrast, Hey et al used an open and transparent representation:
a Bingo Blower. This is also what we used in the experiment reported in this paper.
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The Blower removes any possible suspicion; moreover it enables us to carry out two
treatments which unambiguously have different amounts of ambiguity.
The papers by Hey et al and Abdellaoui et al use the ’traditional’ form of experimental
question: pairwise choice, while Halevy uses reservation price questions. In contrast,
Ahn et al use the allocation type of question pioneered originally by Loomes (1991)
but forgotten for many years until revived by Andreoni and Miller (2002) in a social
choice context and later by Choi et al (2007) in a risky choice context. In this paper we
use allocation questions, which are more informative than pairwise choice questions and
probably more reliable than reservation price questions, and thus more able to detect true
preferences. In this respect the comments by Wilcox (2007) as to the informative nature
of experimental data in general, and pairwise choice questions in particular, should be
noted.
The set of theories of behaviour under ambiguity is now very large. Those theo-
ries - such as maximin - which do not incorporate a preference functional - have been
largely discredited (partly by Hey et al); we do not consider them here. Of the re-
maining theories, one can make a broad distinction between the set of theories that
use second-order probabilities1 and the set that does not. For example, if there are I
possible events i D 1;2;:::; I, but the probabilities of them are not known, those the-
ories that use second-order probabilities assume that the decision-maker works on the
basis that there is a set of J possible values for these probabilities, with the jth set
taking values p1j; p2j;:::; pIj with the probability that the jthset being true given by
￿ j;￿ j D 1;2;:::; J. In contrast, the set of theories that do not use second-order proba-
bilities may assume that the pi may take a range of values in the decision-maker’s mind,
but he or she does not attach probabilities to these possible values. We restrict attention
here to this second set (non two-stage-probability models). This is for three reasons:
the way we represent ambiguity in the laboratory (there is no obvious ￿rst stage); the
complexity of the resulting models in the two-stage-probability set; and problems with
identi￿ability of the underlying preference functionals (because of the large number of
1Sometimes called Mulitple Prior models.3
parameters). In contrast, Halevy uses two-stage-probability models because his experi-
mental design effectively makes such models appropriate. One could also argue that the
same applies to the Ahn et al experiment: there they have three possible outcomes 1, 2
and 3. Subjects are told p2 but they are not told anything about p1 and p3 (except that
they obey the usual probability rules). However, if subjects had read footnote 4 of their
paper2 then a two-stage-probability representation would have been natural.
Ahn et al make another distinction amongst the various speci￿cations of behaviour
under ambiguity: between those speci￿cations that they call smooth and those that they
call kinked. Essentially this distinction depends upon whether preference depends upon
theorderingoftheoutcomes:inExpectedUtilitytheorythisisnotthecaseandhencethis
is a smooth speci￿cation; in contrast, Choquet Expected Utility and (as one can tell from
itsname)RankDependentExpectedUtility(ifoneconsidersthisasatheoryofbehaviour
under ambiguity) are kinked. Ahn et al do not estimate particular preference functionals
but rather two general speci￿cations - one smooth and one kinked. They note that the
smooth speci￿cation "can be derived from" Recursive Expected Utility (REU, which is
a two-stage-probability model); while the kinked speci￿cation "... can be derived as a
special case of a variety of utility models: MEU, CEU, Contraction Expected Utility,
and ￿-MEU3". We note two things: ￿rst that the smooth speci￿cation does not come
only from REU (indeed it comes from several other models, such as the Variational
model of Maccheroni et al (2006)); and secondly, but perhaps more importantly, Ahn et
al do not estimate any preference functionals that come speci￿cally from the models that
they mention. So they do not test directly any of the recent theories of behaviour under
ambiguity.
Abdellaoui et al effectively investigate only one model - essentially Rank Dependent
Expected Utility (RDEU) theory. This has two key elements, a utility function, which
they take to be CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Averse), and a (probability) weighting
2Which read "In practice, the probability of one of the ’ambiguous’ states was drawn from the uniform distribution
over [0,2/3]. This distribution was not announced to the subjects." If the distribution had been revealed to the subjects,
the decision problem would have involved compound risk rather than ambiguity."
3(Our note) MEU, CEU and ￿-MEU are respectively MaxMin Expected Utility, Choquet Expected Utility, and Alpha
Expected Utility (all of which we consider speci￿cally later).4
function, which they take, in the ’Ellsberg Urn’ part of the experiment, to be of the Pr-
elec form: w.p/ D .exp.￿.￿ln.p//￿//￿. It may seem a bit odd using probabilities in a
study of ambiguity, but these probabilities are the true probabilities, which, of course, the
experimenters know, if not the subjects. Using these functional speci￿cations, RDEU is
a special case4 of Choquet Expected Utility, which we estimate. In the ’Natural Uncer-
tainties’ part of the experiment they do not assume any particular form for the weighting
function, so RDEU in this context is precisely Choquet - which we estimate.
There are signi￿cant econometric differences between these various papers. First, and
rather hidden from view, is the fact that we carried out extensive pre-experimental sim-
ulations to ensure that we had a suf￿cient number and an appropriate set of questions to
ask the subjects; too many experiments have too few questions and thus lack power to
discriminate amongst the theories. Second, the estimation methods vary. Underlying any
particular chosen estimation method, there is an assumption about the stochastic spec-
i￿cation of the model. Usually this is tacit; it should be explicit, particular as there is
an obvious source for the stochastic component of the data - if one is estimating subject
by subject (which is the case in all these papers) this comes from either randomness in
preferences or errors made by the subjects. We see no mention in any of this literature
of randomness in preferences, so the noise, the stochastic component, must come from
errors made by the subjects. We explicitly include a story of such mistakes. We estimate
the various preference functionals with the stochastic speci￿cation speci￿cally built in to
the estimation; this does not appear to be the case in the other papers we have mentioned
in this section (though it is the case in Anderson et al (2009) which we will discuss later),
so their assumptions about errors is not clear.
We also go one step further than all these other papers. Believing that economics is all
about predicting, rather than just explaining, we compare our different models by seeing
how good they are at predicting. For the importance of this, see Wilcox (2007 and 2011).
In summary: we represent ambiguity in the laboratory in an open and non-manipulable
4If they had estimated the weighting function at all points, rather than estimating the parameters of the particular
functional form, it would have been precisely Choquet.5
manner; we ask a set of allocation questions to the subjects (obviously with an appro-
priate incentive mechanism) chosen after extensive simulations; we use maximum like-
lihood estimation, with a carefully-speci￿ed stochastic component, to estimate a signif-
icant sub-set of the empirically relevant theories of behaviour under ambiguity, and to
compare their relative goodness of ￿t; ￿nally we compare the various theories in terms
of their predictive ability. To prepare the reader for what is to come, we should warn that
the theorists are going to be disappointed: the recent elegant theories are in general not
empirically superior to simpler theories.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we give a brief
overview of the theories that we are going to ￿t to our data. The following section
describes the way that our data was generated in our experiment. We then relate what we
do to the literature, a part of which we have discussed in this introduction, and give more
detail about what others have done. A section describing the technicalities underlying
our analysis then follows, after which we present our results. We then conclude.
II. Theories under investigation
This section discusses the theories of decision-making under ambiguity that we inves-
tigate. We con￿ne our attention to those theories in which there is an explicit prefer-
ence functional, and hence we exclude earlier (and largely discredited5) theories which
proceed directly to a decision rule. In all the theories which we consider the decision
maker is perceived, in any decision problem, as maximising the value of some prefer-
ence functional. As noted above, we include: (1) Subjective Expected Utility (SEU)
theory in which the decision-maker is envisaged as working with subjective probabil-
ities; (2) the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) model, usually nowadays accredited to
Schmeidler (1989), which allows the agent’s beliefs to be represented by unique but
nonadditive "capacities"; (3) the Alpha Expected Utility model (AEU) of Ghirardato et
al (2004), which models the agent’s beliefs as being represented by a set of probabili-
5Such as, for example, MaxMin (in which the decision-maker looks at the worst that can happen and makes that as
good as possible) and MaxMax (in which the decision-maker looks at the best that can happen and makes that as good as
possible). See Hey, Lotito and Maf￿oletti (2010) for the empirical evidence against such theories.6
ties (but without attaching probabilities to the members of this set) - and its two special
cases, (4) Maxmin Expected Utility of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and (5) Maxmax
Expected Utility; (6) Vector Expected Utility (VEU) of Siniscalchi (2009) in which un-
certain prospect is assessed according to a baseline expected utility evaluation and an
adjustment that re￿ects the individual’s perception of ambiguity and her attitude toward
it; and (7) the Contraction Model of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon and Vergnaud (2008) which
combines Maxmin with Expected Utility at a particular point in the probability set. We
note that SEU is a ’smooth’ speci￿cation in the sense used above, while all the rest are
kinked speci￿cations. We tried to ￿t the Variational model of Maccheroni et al (2006),
which is a smooth speci￿cation, but without success (in terms of goodness of ￿t); this
may have been the consequence of the particular context of our experiment. We give
an overview of these theories below.6 We restrict attention in both the overview and the
detail to decision problems with at most three events - which was the case in our experi-
ment. Call these events E1; E2 and E3 To each event there will be associated an outcome
to the decision-maker which consists of an amount of money. We denote the utility of
the decision-maker for these three outcomes u1;u2 and u3. For some of the theories -
those with a ’rank-dependent’ ￿avouring - the ordering of the outcomes will be crucial
and we will assume in what follows that u1 ￿ u2 ￿ u3 though it should be noted that it
is not necessarily the case that the ordering of the outcomes is the same as the original
ordering of the events: this depends upon the decisions that the decision-maker makes.
Let us denote the event which leads to the highest outcome by E.1/, that to the second
highest outcome by E.2/ and that to the lowest outcome by E.3/. We note that the set
fE.1/; E.2/; E.3/g consists of the numbers 1;2 and 3, though not necessarily in that order.
SUBJECTIVE EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY





6More technical detail are available on this web-site: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdh1/hey%20and%20pace/7
where pi is the subjective probability that event E.i/ occurs. In this case pi D Prob.E.i//
for all i, and, of course p1 C p2 C p3 D 1.
CHOQUET EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY





where the N w’s are weights that depends on nonadditive capacities w that satisfy the
normalisation conditions and monotonicity. In the context of our experiment, a CEU
subject works with six nonadditive capacities wE.1/;wE.2/;wE.3/;wE.2/[E.3/;wE.1/[E.3/ and
wE.1/[E.2/ referring to the three events and their pairwise unions. Crucially, the weights
N w depend upon the ordering of the outcomes:
N w1 D wE.1/
N w2 D wE.1/[E.2/ ￿ wE.1/ (3)
N w3 D 1 ￿ wE.1/[E.2/
We note that the main difference between CEU and SEU consists in the ￿nitely additive
probability measure being replaced by a nonadditive capacity measure. If the capacities
are actually probabilities (that is, if wE.2/[E.3/ D wE.2/ CwE.3/, wE.1/[E.3/ D wE.1/ CwE.3/,
wE.1/[E.2/ D wE.1/ CwE.2/ and wE.1/ CwE.2/ CwE.3/ D 1 ) then (2) is equivalent to (1). We
note that CEU is the same as Rank Dependent Expected Utility (which is not regarded
by all as a theory of behaviour under ambiguity because it uses objective probabilities,
but also uses, as we have already noted, to rescue it from that criticism, a weighting func-
tion, mapping objective probabilities into subjective probabilities) under an appropriate
interpretation of that latter theory7. Similarly Cumulative Prospect Theory, with a ￿xed
7In the context of our experiment, where there are three outcomes and hence 6 capacities, then the relationship
between the two theories is given by the following, where p.1/; p.2/; p.3/ are the objective probabilities and w.:/ is the
weighting function, and the capacities for CEU are as denoted above:
wE.i/ D w.pi/ for i D 1;2;3 and8
reference point, can be regarded in the same way as the same as CEU.
ALPHA EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY
Alpha Expected Utility theory (AEU) was proposed by Ghirardato et al (2004) as a
generalization of the theory proposed in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Ghirardato et al
(2004)’s model implies that, although the decision maker does not know the true proba-
bilities, she acts as if she believes that the true probabilities lie within a set D of proba-
bilities on different events. We can refer to each prior p 2 D as a "possible scenario" that
the decision maker envisions. According to Ghirardato et al, the set D of probabilities
represents formally the ambiguity that the decision maker feels in the decision problem
(they introduce the concept of "revealed ambiguity"). In other words, the size of the set
D measures the perception of ambiguity. The larger D is, the more ambiguity the deci-
sion maker appears to perceive in the decision problem. In particular, no decision maker
perceives less ambiguity than one who reveales a singleton set D D fp1; p2; p3g. In this
case the decision maker is a SEU maximiser with subjective probabilities p1; p2 and p3.
According to Alpha Expected Utility Theory, decisions are made on the basis of a
weighted average of the minimum expected utility over the set D of probabilities and the
maximum expected utility over this set:









The parameter ￿ can be interpreted as an index of the ambiguity aversion of the decision
maker. The larger is ￿ the larger is the weight the decision maker gives to the pessimistic





In order to estimate this model we need to characterise the set D. The theory offers no




3 and the condition that every element in the set has p1 ￿ p
1; p2 ￿ p
2 and p3 ￿ p
3. In
wE.j/[E.j/ D w.pj C pk/ for j 6D k 2 1;2;39
addition, of course p1C p2C p3 D 1 for each element in the set. These conditions imply
that the set D is a triangle properly within the Marschak-Machina Triangle. It reduces to




Maxmin Expected Utility theory (NEU) and Maxmax Expected Utility theory (XEU)
are special cases of AEU. If ￿ is 1 then AEU reduces to the Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) Maxmin Expected Utility model with a non-unique prior, and if ￿ is 0 then AEU
reduces to what we might term the "Gilboa and Schmeidler" Maxmax Expected Utility
model.
VECTOR EXPECTED UTILITY
The Vector Expected Utility (VEU) theory has been recently proposed by Siniscalchi
(2009). In this model, an uncertain prospect is assessed according to a baseline expected
utility evaluation and an adjustment that re￿ects the individual’s perception of ambiguity
and his or her attitude toward it. This adjustment is itself a function of the exposure to
distinct sources of ambiguity, and its variability.
The key elements of the VEU model are a baseline probability and a collection of ran-
dom variables, or adjustment factors, which represent acts exposed to distinct ambiguity
sources and also re￿ect complementarity between ambiguous events.
The VEU model can be formally de￿ned as follows:











Here p D .p1; p2; p3/ is the baseline prior; for 1 ￿ j < 3, each ￿ j D .￿ j1;::;￿ j3/
is an adjustment factor that satis￿es Ep[￿ j] D
3 P
iD1
pi￿ ji D 0; and A: Rn ! R satis￿es
A.0/ D 0 and A.￿/ D A.￿￿/. The function A is an adjustment function that re￿ects
attitudes towards ambiguity. We need to specify the function A.:/ and also the values of
the ￿8. After some simpli￿cation, we get that the VEU objective function takes the form,
8More details of the assumptions that we have made are available on the web-site:
http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdh1/hey%20and%20pace/10
under these assumptions:
(6) V EU D
3 P
iD1
piui ￿ ￿.ju1 ￿ u2j C ju2 ￿ u3j/
This has intuitive appeal: decisions are made on the basis of expected utility ’corrected’
for differences between the utilities of the various outcomes, weighted by a parameter ￿
that re￿ects the decision-maker’s attitude to ambiguity.
THE CONTRACTION MODEL
Gajdos et al (2008) proposed a model (the "Contraction Model" or CM) in which it is
possible to compare acts under different objective information structures. According to
this theory, preferences are given by








where ￿ measures imprecision aversion and P1; P2; P3 is a particular probability dis-
tribution in the set D of possible distributions. It is what is called the ’Steiner Point’
of the set - which is, in a particular sense, the ’centre’ of the set. If we take the set
D of possible distributions as all points .p1; p2; p3/ such that p1 C p2 C p3 D 1 and
p1 ￿ p
1; p2 ￿ p
2; p3 > p
3then the Steiner point is the point .P1; P2; P3/ where
Pi D p
i C .1 ￿ p
1 ￿ p
2 ￿ p
3/=3 for i D 1;2;3. We note that we have characterised
this set D (of possible probabilities) in the same way as we have done for the Alpha
Expected Utility model - as a triangle properly within the Marschak-Machina Triangle.
The Steiner point is the ’central’ point of this triangle.
III. Our Experimental Design
As we have already noted, in our experiment ambiguity was implemented with a Bingo
Blower and subjects were presented with a set of allocation problems, which were deter-
mined after extensive Monte Carlo simulations.11
Subjects completed the experiment individually at screened computer terminals. They
were given written instructions and then showed a PowerPoint presentation of the in-
structions. There was a Bingo Blower in action at the front of the laboratory throughout
the experiment.9 The Bingo Blower is a rectangular-shaped, glass-sided, object some 3
feet high and 2 feet by 2 feet in horizontal section. Inside the glass walls are a set of
balls in continuous motion being moved about by a jet of wind from a fan in the base. In
addition, images of the Blower in action were projected via a video camera onto two big
screens in the laboratory. Subjects were free at any stage to go closer to the Blower to ex-
amine it as much as they wanted. All the balls inside the Blower can at all times be seen
by people outside, but, unless the number of balls in the Blower is low, the number of
balls of differing colours can not be counted because they are continually moving around.
Hence the balls in the bingo can be seen but not counted (unless the total number of balls
is low), and the information available is not suf￿cient to calculate objective probabili-
ties. This ensures that, while objective probabilities do exist, the decision-makers cannot
know them. In this way, we have created a situation of genuine ambiguity which elimi-
nates the problem of suspicion; the problem of using directly a second-order probability
distribution; and the problem of using real events, therefore keeping the problem more
similar to the original Ellsberg one (Ellsberg, 1961). We note that a further advantage of
this way of creating ambiguity in the laboratory is the fact that the information available
is the same for all subjects. Hence there is no role for the so called ‘comparative igno-
rance’ (Fox and Tversky, 1995), and hence we can exclude such a factor as a possible
explanation of behaviour.10
This Bingo Blower played a crucial role in representing ambiguity and in providing
incentives. Inside the Bingo Blower were balls of three different colours: pink, yellow
and blue. The number of each colour depended on the treatment:
9On our site http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdh1/hey%20and%20pace/ can be found the instructions (both in Word
and PowerPoint) and videos of the Bingo Blower, as well as screenshots of the experimental software.
10One criticism concerning the implementation of ambiguity in the lab using the Bingo Blower comes from Morone
and Ozdemir (2011). The criticism consists of the observation that the ability of getting the right probabilities is subject
speci￿c; that is, subjects have different counting skills, or might have problems in the perception of colours. This criticism
may be true but it is not clear how this could affect the validity of the Bingo Blower in generating ambiguity in the lab.12




In Treatment 1 the balls of each colour could be counted, though one might not be
sure of the number of blue balls; this was the least ambiguous treatment. In Treatment
2 the balls of each colour could not be counted; this was the most ambiguous treatment.
Note that in this latter treatment subjects could get some idea of the relative numbers of
balls of the different colours but not count the numbers precisely. It was reasonably clear
that there were more blue balls than yellow, and more yellow than pink, though precise
calculations could not be made.
Sixty six subjects completed Treatment 1 and sixty three completed Treatment 2. In
both treatments, subjects were presented with a total of 76 questions. Each of these asked
them to allocate a given quantity of tokens between the colours. There were two types
of question. Type 1 asked then to allocate the tokens between two of the colours; Type
2 asked them to allocate the tokens between one of the three colours and the other two.
In each problem subjects were told the exchange rate between tokens and money for
each of the colours in the question. Thus an allocation of tokens implied an allocation of
money to two or three of the colours.
We provided an incentive for carefully choosing the allocations with the following
payment scheme. We told subjects that, after answering all 76 questions, one of the
questions would be chosen at random, and the subject’s allocation to the two or three
colours for that problem retrieved from the computer. At that point the subject and the
experimenter went over to the Bingo Blower, and the subject rotated the tube to expell
one ball. The colour of the ball, the question picked at random and their answer to that
question determined their payment. To be precise: if the problem chosen was one of
Type 1, then they would be paid the money implied by their allocation to the colour of
the ball expelled; if it was the colour not mentioned in that question they would be paid
nothing; if the problem chosen was one of Type 2, then they would be paid the money13
implied by their allocation to the colour of the ball expelled. In addition they received a
show-up fee of £5. They ￿lled in a brief questionnaire, were paid, signed a receipt and
were free to go. A total of 129 subjects participated at the experiments, 40 of them at
CESARE at LUISS in Rome (Italy) and the remaining 89 at EXEC at The University
of York (UK). In both cases, subjects were recruited using the ORSEE (Greiner 2004)
software and the experiment was run using a purpose-written software written in Visual
Basic 6.11
IV. Related Experimental Literature
Having described our experimental implementation and motivation we are now in a
position to survey the relevant experimental literature in more detail. We con￿ne our-
selves to recent important contributions to the literature; earlier literature is surveyed in
Camerer and Weber (1992) and Camerer (1995).
Hey et al (2010), using the same implementation of ambiguity in the laboratory as we
use here, also with three possible outcomes, but asking a large number (162) of pairwise
choice questions, examined the descriptive and predictive ability of twelve theories of
behaviour under ambiguity: some very old and not using a preference functional (pro-
ceeding directly to a decision rule) such as the original MaxMin and MaxMax; and some
very recent, such as the Alpha Expected Utility model. The ￿ndings were that the very
old simple models (those without a preference function) were largely discredited, but
that more modern and rather sophisticated models (such as Choquet) did not perform
suf￿ciently better than simple theories such as Subjective Expected Utility theory. Esti-
mation of the preference functions was done using maximum likelihood techniques with
the stochastic speci￿cation determined by a model of how subjects made errors in their
pairwise choices.
Ahn et al (2010) used allocation questions, like we do here, but implemented am-
biguity by simply not telling the subjects the true objective probabilities of two of the
three possible outcomes of the experiment. They did not look at the predictive ability
11Which can be found and downloaded from http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~jdh1/hey%20and%20pa.ce/14
of any models; neither did they examine the descriptive performance of any speci￿c the-
ory. Instead they examined two broad classes of functionals, smooth and kinked, which
are special cases of various theoretical models that we speci￿cally estimate. Econo-
metrically, they estimated, subject by subject, the risk-aversion parameter of an assumed
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion utility function, and a second parameter measuring am-
biguity aversion, using Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS), that is by minimising the sum
of squared differences between actual allocations and the theoretically optimal alloca-
tions for those risk and ambiguity aversion coef￿cients. Interestingly they comment in a
footnote that "...for simplicity, the estimation technique for both speci￿cations is NLLS,
rather than a structural model using maximum likelihood (ML). We favor the NLLS ap-
proach, because it provides a good ￿t and offers straightforward interpretation." They do
not give suf￿cient detail to make clear exactly what this rather cryptic comment means.
Halevy (2007) implemented ambiguity in the laboratory using traditional Ellsberg
Urns and asked reservation price questions. Because of the way that his ’Ellsberg Urns’
were implemented, his set of models includes some models that we do not consider here,
particularlytwo-stage-probabilitymodelssuchasRecursiveNonexpectedUtilityandRe-
cursive Expected Utility. But we include some that he does not - making the two papers
complementary. He used reservation price questions; we should describe and discuss
these - as they are an alternative to pairwise choice questions and to allocation questions.
Essentially he wants to know how much subjects value bets on various events. Let us
consider a particular Ellsberg Urn and a particular colour. The subject is asked to imag-
ine that he or she owns a bet which pays a certain amount of money ($2) if that coloured
ball is drawn from that particular urn. Halevy wanted to elicit the subject’s reservation
price for this bet; this reservation price telling us about the subject’s preferences. Halevy
used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism: "the subject was asked to state a min-
imal price at which she was willing to sell the bet... The subject set the selling price by
moving a lever on a scale between $0 and $2. Then a random number between $0 and $2
was generated by the computer. The random number was the ￿buying price￿ for the bet.
If the buying price was higher than the reservation price that the subject stated, she was15
paid the buying price (and her payoff did not depend on the outcome of her bet). How-
ever, if the buying price was lower than the minimal selling price, the actual payment
depended on the outcome of her bet." This BDM technique is well-known in the liter-
ature, but is complicated to describe and dif￿cult for subjects to understand. Moreover
there are well-known problems, see Karni and Zafra (1979), with using this technique
when preferences are not expected utility preferences - which, of course, is precisely the
concern of the paper. Halevy did not use his data to estimate preference functionals and
hence did not compare their descriptive and predictive power; instead he carried out an
extensive set of tests of the various theories. Unfortunately this econometric procedure
does not help to draw unique conclusions about the ’best’ preference functional, even for
individual subjects. Indeed Halevy concludes that his "...￿ndings indicate that currently
there is no unique theoretical model that universally captures ambiguity preferences".
Abdellaoui et al (2011) investigated only Rank Dependent Expected Utility theory.
They did not explicitly examine its descriptive (nor predictive) ability, being more con-
cernedwiththeeffectontheestimatedutilityandweightingfunctionsofdifferentsources
of ambiguity. As we have already noted, they implemented ambiguity in the laboratory in
two ways: in one part of the experiment, using 8-colour ’Ellsberg Urns’; and in the other
part using ’natural’ events. They elicited certainty equivalents (or reservation prices) in
order to infer preferences, not using the BDM mechanism (presumably because of the
problems we have alluded to above), but instead using Holt-Laury price lists.12 This
mechanism seems to be a better way of eliciting certainty equivalents, even though the
outcome does appear to be sensitive to the elements in the list - the number of them and
their range. The resulting certainty equivalents are a valuation, just as Halevy’s reser-
vation prices, even though they come from a set of pairwise choice questions. However
econometrically it must be the case that the valuation resulting from a list with n ele-
ments is less informative than n independent pairwise choice questions. They estimated
utility functions (assumed to be power or CRRA) "using nonlinear least squares estima-
12In which subjects are presented with a set of pairwise choices arranged in a list. In each pair subjects are asked
to choose between some ambiguous lottery and some certain amount of money. As one goes down the list, the certain
amount increases. The subject’s certainty equivalent is revealed by the point at which the subject switches from choosing
the lottery to choosing the certain amount. See Holt and Laury (2002).16
tion with the certainty equivalent as dependent variable"; similarly they estimated the
weighting function by "minimising the quadratic distance". They do not explain why.
Anderson et al (2009) use a technique similar to that used by Ahn et al (2010) in
estimating two parameters (one a measure of risk aversion and the other a measure of
ambiguity) in a minimalist non-EU model. They comment that this minimalist model
comes either from the Source-Dependent Risk Attitude model or the Uncertain Priors
model; in our termininology it is a two-stage-probability model13 that looks exactly like
Recursive Expected Utility. The bottom line is the following: suppose that there are
I possible outcomes i D 1;2;:::; I with unknown probabilities. The decision-maker
has a set of J possible values for these probabilities; we denote the j’th possible value
p1j; p2j;:::; pIj and the decision-maker considers that the probability that this is the







Note that there are two functions here: u.:/ which can be considered as a normal utility
function, capturing attitude to risk; and v.:/ which can be considered as an ambiguity
function; note that if v.y/ D y then this model reduces to Expected Utility theory. It
is the non-linearity of v.:/ that captures aversion to ambiguity. Anderson et al (2009)
assumed that both these functions are power functions - so that u.x/ D x￿ and v.y/ D y￿
They estimated the two parameters ￿ and ￿ using maximum likelihood techniques (with
careful attention paid to the stochastic speci￿cation) and rather heroic assumptions14
about the ￿’s and p’s.
V. Technical Assumptions
Before proceeding to our estimates we need to make some technical assumptions. In
particular we need to specify our stochastic assumptions and those concerning the utility
13Chambers et al (2010) also investigate a generic Multiple Priors model.
14We note that the authors freely admit this and discuss the serious identi￿cation problems with two-stage-probability
models.17
function. As far as the ￿rst is concerned we assumed a Fechner error for each subject’s
decisions. As far as the second is concerned, we chose to use the CARA function. We
give more detail below.
Stochastic assumptions
We need to specify the stochastic nature of our data. We assume that the subject
implements his or her optimal allocation in each decision problem with some error, either
because of an error in its computation or an error in its implementation. So, rather than
allocate x￿
i to colour i; the subject allocates x￿
i C ": To complete this story, we have to
make an assumption about the distribution of ". We follow precedence and assume that
it is Fechner error: that is, we assume that the " are independent and identically normally
distributed with zero mean and constant variance 1=s2. We estimate s along with the
other parameters.15
Functional form of the utility function
We have to assume a particular form for the utility function of the subjects. We took




if r 6D 0
D x=75 if r D 0 (8)
We assume that the parameter r varies from subject to subject and we estimate it along
withtheotherparameters. Wechosethisfunctionalspeci￿cationforanumberofreasons:
it has a single parameter; it produces good estimates and it leads to a nice functional form
for the optimal allocations for the preference functionals under consideration. We can
show this latter as follows. For all of the problems and most of the preference functionals
15We are aware of the work of Wilcox (2008) and of Blavatskyy (2011) both of which suggest that the distribution
might be heteroscedastic. But, in the context of our experimental design, it is not clear how the heteroscedasticity should
be speci￿ed.18
the objective is to maximise a function of the form
w1u.e1x1/ C w2u.e2x2/
subject to the constraint that x1 C x2 D m. Here m denotes the amount of tokens to
allocate, xi the tokens allocated to colour i and ei the exchange rate between tokens
allocated to colour i and money (i D 1;2). The weights w1 and w2 depend upon the









We note that there is no guarantee that the optimal allocations are positive and less than
m. In the experiment subjects were constrained to have all allocations non-negative and
their sum equal to m and we took that into account in the estimation.
In partial defence of the assumption to use a CARA speci￿cation, we note that if we
used instead the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function, then the op-
timisation would imply an allocation of a proportion of the initial tokens to each colour,
with the optimal proportional being strictly between 0 and 1. This clearly contradicts
the empirical evidence which frequently showed all-or-nothing allocations to particular
colours. The CARA utility function has the advantage that it easily accomodates bound-
ary portfolios, while the CRRA speci￿cation does not.
VI. Results
We estimated each of the 7 preference functionals for each of the 129 subjects on a
subset of the data - precisely a randomly chosen 60 of the 76 questions16 - using the
constrained maximum likelihood procedure in GAUSS. We thus have, for each prefer-
16Because the subjects received the 76 questions in different orders (and with the colour on the left and the colour
on the right randomly selected) this means that the position of the 60 estimation questions (and hence the 16 prediction
questions) varied from subject to subject, but for each subject they were randomly positioned).19
ence functional and each subject, estimates of the parameters of the functional, of s, the
precision, and of r, the risk aversion parameter. In addition, we have the maximised
log-likelihood. We then used, for each subject and each preference the estimated para-
meters to predict behaviour on the remaining 16 questions. This gives us a prediction
log-likelihood for each functional and for each subject - this is, of course, a measure
of the predictive ability of the theory. All this information is available on our site. In
synthesising these results, we ￿rst present information from the estimation part and then
from the prediction part.
A. Estimation
This section reports our results on estimation. While we are mainly interested in the
goodness-of-￿t of the various models, we start with some observations about treatment
effects. We then turn to goodness-of-￿t, as measured by the maximised log-likelihoods,
and a comparison of the goodness-of-￿t of the various models, necessarily incorporating
corrections of the log-likelihoods for different degrees of freedom (numbers of parame-
ters).
We had two treatments: Treament 1 with very little ambiguity; Treatment 2 with con-
siderable ambiguity. We had expected to ￿nd treatment effects in our estimates. One
place that we did not ￿nd such effects was in the goodness-of-￿t of the various models.
The mean log-likelihoods (both ￿tted and prediction, corrected and uncorrected) and
their standard deviations, are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The means of the log-likelihoods
are, with one exception, always higher in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1, but, at the
same time, the standard deviations are higher in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. An
examination of histograms of the data shows the reason - the distributions of the log-
likelihoods for Treatment 1 are symmetrical while those for Treatment 2 are skewed to
the left.17 So one can not conclude that the ￿t is generally better in Treatment 2 than
in Treatment 1. Indeed this conclusion comes out of the t-tests reported in Tables 2 and
3, which show clearly that there are no treatment effects in the average goodness-of-￿t,
17The histograms are on the website. We have no explanation for these differently shaped distributions.20
neither ￿tted nor prediction.
The same conclusion comes from an examination of the estimates of the precision pa-
rameter s. Examine Table 1, and, in particular, the rows reporting the average estimates
of s in the various models in the two treatments. Nowhere are the differences signi￿-
cant. So subjects on average are equally noisy, equally likely to make mistakes, in the
two treatments. This is quite reassuring: subjects, on average, are not reacting to the
increased ambiguity by becoming less precise.
What they are doing can be seen from the other average parameter estimates presented
in Table 1. These are averages over the 66 subjects in Treatment 1 and the 63 subjects
in Treatment 2. Starting with the SEU estimates, we note that the average estimates
in Treatment 1 of the subjective probabilities attached to pink, yellow and blue were
0.2186, 0.3131, and 0.4683 respectively, while in Treatment 2 they were 0.2300, 0.3481
and 0.4219. Recall that the true probabilities in both treatments were 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5.
So in Treatment 1 they were very close on average to the true probabilities, while in
Treatment 2 they were on average further away, and closer to equal probabilities. Note
also that the average estimated probabilities for the yellow and blue average probabilities
are signi￿cantly different between the two treatments. So this seems to be the reaction to
the increased ambiguity between treatments: not a change in precision, but a change in
the estimates of the subjective probabilities. The average risk aversion and precision es-
timates do not differ signi￿cantly across treatments, which is interesting and reassuring:
on average we do not have different subjects in the two treatments.
A similar pattern is evident across all theories: for example with Choquet there are
signi￿cant differences in the average capacities attached to yellow and blue, and signif-
icant differences in the average capacities attached to (pink and blue) and to (pink and
yellow) between the two treatments. In fact, we see very similar treatment effects on
average parameter estimates across all models, with the possible exception of the Con-
traction Model. With that model the set of possible distributions is slightly larger, and
the alpha parameter also slightly larger, in Treatment 2 compared to Treatment 1, but not
signi￿cantly so.21
We now examine the goodness-of-￿t of the various models - as measured by the max-
imised log-likelihoods on the 60 observations used for ￿tting. Table 2a shows the average
log-likelihoods over each of the various theories. In both treatments, CEU comes out as
the best, followed by CM and by the AEU. However, this is an unfair comparison as
CEU has more parameters than all the other models. Indeed, as the models differ in
terms of the numbers of parameters involved in their estimation, we should correct these
log-likelihoods for the number of degrees of freedom.18 We do so using the Bayes In-
formation Criterion19 and hence we get Table 2b. From this we see that in Treatment 1,
all the models perform very similarly, with AEU and CM marginally better (though SEU
does perform strongly). while in Treatment 2 CM emerges as the overall winner.
However these average ￿gures obscure lots of detail. Moreover, we are not trying to
￿nd one model that is best for everyone. Therefore let us look in more detail at these log-
likelihoods, both uncorrected (for degrees of freedom) and corrected, and, in particular,
let us look at the rankings of the various models.
We start with the uncorrected log-likelihoods for the 7 functionals. In Table 4 the num-
ber in brackets after the name of the functional is the number of estimated parameters.
The table shows the percentage of subjects for which the uncorrected log-likelihood of
each preference functional came in the various possible positions - 1st through to 7th: We
also show the average ranking for each functional, obtained assigning a value of 1 to the
￿rst position in the ranking and a value of 7 to the 7th position in the ranking. This means
that the lower is the average ranking, the better a particular model is performing from the
descriptive point of view. We note that not surprisingly, the models with more parame-
ters, CEU, AEU and CM do well on this ranking, while the models with few parameters
are penalized. We once again notice very few differences between the two treatments.
If we correct the log-likelihoods for the number of parameters (using the Bayesian
Information Criterion) and redo the rankings we get Table 5. On this basis, on average,
18The number of parameters are as follows: SEU 4, CEU 8, AEU 6, NEU 5, XEU 5, VEU 5 and CM 6. Notice that
in SEU and VEU the three probabilities add to 1. We include in this count the parameters common to all models, namely
the risk aversion parameter and the precision.
19Though see our comments later.22
NEU, SEU and CM do well, and interestingly because they very rarely end up in a very
bad position. In contrast, CEU does rather poorly (after being penalised for degrees
of freedom) not only because it does not end up in good positions very often but also
because it comes out worst rather often.
We follow convention20 (though not necessarily approving of it) by reporting signi￿-
cance tests. We use different kinds of tests for different pairs of models. If one model is
nested inside another21 we test whether the latter ￿ts signi￿cantly better than the former
by using standard log-likelihood ratio tests. If neither model is nested inside the other
we use Clarke (Clarke 2007) tests. Using a signi￿cance level of 5% we get Table 6; at
1% we get Table 7. In each table the entry reports the percentage of subjects for whom
the row model is signi￿cantly better on these criteria than the column model. We are
looking for models where the row numbers (except for the main diagonal) are large and
the column numbers are small. On this basis both CEU and the CM look good.
The results using signi￿cance tests seem to con￿ict with the picture painted by the
corrected ￿tted log-likelihoods. This is partly because there is no consensus amongst
econometricians as to what is the correct ’correction’ to apply to ￿tted log-likelihoods to
correct for degrees of freedom: some econometricians advocate the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), other the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The former uses 2k ￿
2LL where k is the number of degrees of freedom and LL the log-likelihood; the latter
uses k ln.n/￿2LL where n is the number of observations used in estimation. If n is 8 or
more, the BIC punishes the log-likelihood more heavily for its degrees of freedom than
doestheAIC.Inourexperimentthen usedfor￿ttingwas60sothereisheavypunishment
for degrees of freedom. Moreover, these corrections are answering different questions
than those that the signi￿cance tests attempt to answer.22 So it is hardly surprising that
20However we do not follow what seems to be the convention in the related literature in reporting tests of GARP. This
is for three reasons: (1) to apply a GARP test it must be the case that income is constant, while in our experiment token
income varied across the 76 allocation tasks; (2) the GARP analysis is useful when two allocations commodities are
symmetric (that is, an individual cares only about the relative price of these goods and does not have any particular taste
on commodities themselves). In our paper this does not apply because we never have symmetric situations (we consider
an ambiguous setting with unknown objective probabilities); (3) we are not sure what these tests tell us other than that
the behaviour of our subjects was not random (which is rather obvious from the results that we do report).
21SEU is nested inside all the other models, NEU is nested inside CM, and NEU and XEU are both nested inside AEU.
22Note that the critical values of the chi-square statistic do not rise linearly with the number of degrees of freedom,
while both the Akaike and Bayesian corrections do.23
we get different answers.
The overall impression that emerges from the goodness-of-￿t analyses, particularly if
we correct for the numbers of parameters involved in the estimation, is that there are
not enormous differences between the various models. Tables 2b and 5 make this point
particularly clearly. Let us now see if we get a clearer picture from the prediction log-
likelihoods.
B. Prediction
We turn to predictive ability. As we have already noted, we follow the Wilcox rec-
ommended procedure (Wilcox, 2011), in which the models are estimated on a subset
of problems (60 of them), and then these estimates are used to predict choices on the
rest of the problems in the experiment (16 of them).23 Doing this we can compare the
predictions with actual behaviour and compute the appropriate log-likelihoods, and, in
principle, come up with recommendations about the use of theories. However, how one
should do these comparisons is not clear, and there seems to be no clear message emerg-
ing from the data. Or perhaps that is the message: there is no clear winner amongst the
preference functionals.
We present a number of different analyses of the prediction log-likelihoods. Our ￿rst
set of analyses assumes that we simply use the models for prediction and do not consider
their descriptive ability. We then move on to asking whether prior information (about the
best-￿tting functional) improves our predictive ability. Within the ￿rst set of analyses,
we start with simple histograms. We then rank the preference functionals on the basis of
their predictive ability, and then see how often each functional comes ￿rst in predictive
power. Both these measures are solely concerned with the ordering of predictive ability,
however, and do not consider the magnitude of the differences in prediction. So we
then introduce a cardinal measure of relative predictive ability. We then move on to our
second set of analyses, where we assume that the person making the prediction about
23Stictly speaking Wilcox (2011) advocates what he calls out-of-context predictions, which are possible in his context
(pairwise choice) but not in ours. The split of the 76 questions between those used for ￿tting (60) and those for prediction
(16) was chosen rather arbitrarily.24
a particular individual is aware of the best-￿tting functional for that individual. We ask
whether this improves prediction, and present two different analyses in an attempt to
answer it.
We begin with predictions unconditional on ￿tting, and present in Figure 1 histograms
of the prediction log-likelihoods over all subjects. These are rather remarkable, showing
a property that is also true for the ￿tted log-likelihoods: the distributions across sub-
jects are very similar for the different models. In Figure 2 we add substance to this
observation by drawing scatters of the SEU log-likelihoods, against each of the other’s
log-likelihoods. This makes the point that the prediction log-likelihoods are strongly
correlated and almost identical across preference functionals. The overwhelming im-
pression that one gets from these ￿gures is that there is more variability between subjects
than between preference functionals. This is also the case with the Bayesian corrected
log-likelihoods which we show in Figure 3, and on which we have already commented.
Let us try and delve deeper. There are various ways that we can do this. First, we
rank the various preference functionals on the basis of their predictive ability. Doing this
gives us Table 8a. We extract from this the average rankings (Table 8b), obtained, as for
the estimation analysis, by assigning a value of 1 to the ￿rst position in the ranking and
a value of 7 to the 7th position in the ranking. Thus the lower is the average ranking,
the better a particular model is performing from the prediction point of view. Further we
tabulate in Table 8c the number of times each functional was best in predicting. What
do we conclude from Tables 8a, 8b and 8c? That, on average, if we know nothing at all
about our subjects we would be very little better off using one model rather than any
other: CM is slightly better than the others in Treatment 1 and the AEU in Treatment
2, but the differences are trivial. Indeed what is rather remarkable about these three
Tables is how similar the various models are in their predictive ability. However, one
could argue that this conclusion is misleading as it is based on rankings and does not
worry about magnitudes. Let us therefore present a ￿nal analysis, the results of which
are presented in Table 9.
To construct the table we have calculated in percentage terms how much higher is25
the highest prediction log-likelihood (obviously obtained by the best predicting model)
relative to each other model’s prediction log-likelihood and the averaged this across all
subjects. In this way we get a measure of how much poorer each model is compared
to the best predicting model. For example SEU has a prediction log-likelihood which
is bettered on average by 13.17% by the best-predicting model (which of course varies
from subject to subject). The interesting point about Table 9 is the similarity between the
numbers - with the sole exception of CM. If one uses CM instead of the best-predicting
modelthenonehasarelativelysmalldeteriorationof8.13%withrespecttothemaximum
prediction log-likelihood.
However the differences are small: the conclusion coming from all the above is that,
regardless of how one analyses the data, there is very little difference between theories
in terms of predictive ability. So if one knows nothing about a particular individual and
wants to predict their behaviour, one might as well use any theory. However, this does
not mean that certain theories might not come into their own if one does know something
about the individual whose behaviour you want to predict. Consider Table 10, in which
the columns indicate the best ￿tting model (as determined by the Bayes corrected log-
likelihood) and the table entries indicate the average ranking on prediction using the row
model. So, for example, if SEU ￿ts the best according to this criterion (it happens for
24 percent of the subjects), then using SEU to predict has an average ranking of 3.75,
using CEU the same, using AEU 4.25 and so on. Ideally the diagonal entries should
be the smallest in each column - on the grounds that the best ￿tting should be the best
predicting, but this is not always the case. One clear exception is CM - when it is the
best ￿tting it also ranks highest for prediction - in both treatments. Indeed CM generally
does rather well on this prediction-ranking criterion. But overall there is again the same
message: there is not an enormous difference in predictive ability between theories.
One might object to the analysis above in that it uses rankings - which do not worry
about magnitudes but just orderings. Accordingly we include Table 11 where once again
the columns indicate the best ￿tting model (using the Bayes corrected log-likelihood)
while the rows give the square root of the average sum of squared deviations between the26
actual allocation and that predicted from the row model; this is a measure of the goodness
of ￿t of the predictions. Once again, we would expect to have the smallest entries in any
particular column along the main diagonal, but this is not the case. When SEU or AEU
(in Treatment 1) or CM are the best, then it is best respectively to use SEU, AEU and
CM for prediction purposes, but when, for example, CEU is the best ￿tting it seems to
be the worst in prediction.The bottom line from Table 11 is that SEU would be the best
to use for prediction in Treatment 1 and CM in Treatment 2 if these are the best-￿tting
models. Similarly AEU (and its subcases NEU and XEU) in Treatment 1; but if CEU or
VEU are the best-￿tting, one might as well use SEU for prediction. The one thing that
sticks out from Treatment 2 is that CM does rather well everywhere.
It seems to be really dif￿cult to come up with an answer to the question: "having ￿tted
all the models to the data for any individual, which is the best model to use for predicting
the behaviour of that individual". It does seem to be the case that in Treatment 1 SEU
does not do badly, while in Treatment 2, if either AEU or CM ￿ts best then one should
use respectively AEU and CM to predict, but apart from that one would just be as well
of using any model to predict. As we said earlier there is more noise between subjects
than between preference functionals.
VII. Conclusions
In one sense Figures 2 and 3 tell almost everything: there is much more difference
between subjects than between preference functionals. This is evidenced by the fact
that: (1) the average (across all subjects) of the standard deviation (across all preference
functionals) of the corrected log-likelihoods is just 6.46, while (2) the average (across
all preference functionals) of the standard deviation (across all subjects) of the corrected
log-likelihoods is 85.96. Similarly: (3) the average (across all subjects) of the standard
deviation (across all preference functionals) of the prediction log-likelihoods is just 2.16,
while (4) the average (across all preference functionals) of the standard deviation (across
all subjects) of the prediction log-likelihoods is 20.75.24 The similarity of the theories
24Treatment 1 and 2 values are as follows:27
in prediction is particularly galling for the theorists. However, there are two models that
seem to be potentially better than SEU - namely AEU and, particularly CM. CEU seems
to simply have two many parameters. VEU does not seem to be a serious improvement
on SEU. These results seem to be true both for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, though we
could recommend the use of SEU in Treatment 1 and CM in Treatment 2.
We return to the treatment difference that we noted at the beginning of the Estimation
section: namely, the differences in the estimated parameters across treatments. This dif-
ference seems to be more important than the differences in the goodness-of-￿ts of the
various models. So, it seems to be more the case that subjects change their perception of
the ambiguity rather than change their reaction to it. Obviously we do not have subjects
who did both treatments, so what follows is a conjecture: if they are SEU in Treatment
1 then they remain SEU in Treatment 2, but change their perception of the probabilities.
And the same, mutatis mutandis, with the other models. This is important for any theorist
doing comparative statics.
There remains the large variance across subjects. For some subjects - those with large
log-likelihoods (and hence those for whom the models ￿t well) - we may be capturing
their behaviour with one or other of these models. However, for those subjects with
small log-likelihoods (those for whom the estimated models ￿t badly) we seem not to be
capturing their behaviour. It follows either that they are very imprecise in their decision-
making, or that none of these preference functionals describe their decision-making cor-
rectly. If we knew which of these was true, we would know what to do next. With
the ￿rst explanation we should spend more time investigating their errors, rather than
creating new preference functionals25; while with the second we should do exactly the
opposite: produce more empirically valid theories rather than worry about errors. But
given the theoretical activity of the past decade, one may well ask what kind of theories
these should be.
1: 6.32 and 6.59
2: 76.22 and 95.50
3: 1.86 and 2.47
4: 19.72 and 21.88
25Which is a point with which Wilcox (2008) would agree.28
The many recent theories, not only those in the set that we have been considering,
but also, and particularly, those in the two-stage-probability set, can be characterised
by the sophistication of the decision-maker. While we understand and appreciate the
"as-if" methodology of economics, we suspect that these sophisticated characterisations
are moving in the wrong direction. The allocation problem under ambiguity that we
have posed to our subjects is a dif￿cult one; we suspect that many of our subjects were
adopting a strategy of simplifying the problem ￿rst before applying a simple preference
functional. They may well be editing the problem before evaluating it. So perhaps
the message is that we experimentalists need to try and observe this editing process,
and then ask the theorists to produce a simpli￿ed theory (not necessarily acting through
preference functionals) to tackle the simpli￿ed problem. Sophisticated theory does not
seem to work.
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Tables and Figures
Theory Parameter All Treatment1 Treatment2 t-test diff.
SEU p1 0.224 0.219 0.230 -0.590
p2 0.330 0.313 0.348 -3.531
p3 0.446 0.468 0.422 2.319
r 0.118 0.120 0.116 0.184
s 0.194 0.193 0.195 -0.059
CEU w1 0.203 0.200 0.206 -0.290
w2 0.255 0.230 0.282 -3.145
w3 0.403 0.429 0.376 2.157
W1 0.728 0.741 0.715 1.216
W2 0.556 0.576 0.535 1.893
W3 0.468 0.437 0.501 -2.304
r 0.104 0.110 0.097 0.703
s 0.223 0.224 0.221 0.101
AEU w1 0.165 0.161 0.168 -0.424
w2 0.268 0.254 0.284 -2.079
w3 0.381 0.402 0.358 1.800
￿ 0.613 0.637 0.587 1.039
r 0.123 0.122 0.124 -0.098
s 0.210 0.212 0.208 0.110
NEU w1 0.192 0.186 0.198 -0.677
w2 0.290 0.274 0.306 -2.714
w3 0.403 0.423 0.382 1.777
r 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.014
s 0.204 0.206 0.203 0.081
XEU w1 0.191 0.188 0.195 -0.394
w2 0.301 0.288 0.315 -2.242
w3 0.416 0.441 0.389 2.295
r 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.000
s 0.198 0.197 0.199 -0.083
TABLE 1￿DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ESTIMATED PARAMETERS32
Theory Parameter All Treatment 1 Treatment 2 t-diff test
VEU p1 0.231 0.226 0.235 -0.411
p2 0.328 0.311 0.346 -3.464
p3 0.441 0.463 0.419 2.160
￿ 0.027 0.030 0.024 0.618
r 0.108 0.107 0.110 -0.151
s 0.198 0.197 0.198 -0.042
CM w1 0.116 0.118 0.115 0.201
w2 0.216 0.205 0.227 -1.115
w3 0.330 0.356 0.303 1.607
￿ 0.393 0.428 0.358 0.988
r 0.107 0.108 0.107 0.066
s 0.212 0.213 0.210 0.102
TABLE 1 ￿ (CONT.)
A) Uncorrected log-likelihoods
SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM Obs.
All -177.45 -169.12 -172.36 -174.11 -175.71 -175.75 -171.23 129
(42.62) (44.19) (42.39) (42.84) (42.51) (44.06) (42.25)
Treatment 1 -179.77 -171.18 -174.40 -176.14 -178.22 -178.26 -173.37 66
(37.53) (39.39) (37.98) (38.05) (37.30) (38.70) (37.83)
Treatment 2 -175.02 -166.96 -170.22 -171.97 -173.09 -173.11 -169.00 63
(47.57) (48.95) (46.78) (47.56) (47.53) (49.23) (46.63)
t-stat diff. -0.631 -0.540 -0.558 -0.552 -0.683 -0.663 -0.586
TABLE 2￿A) AVERAGE FITTED LOG-LIKELIHOODS (STANDARD DEVIATION ARE IN PARENTHESIS)
B) Bayesian Information Criterion
SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM Obs.
All 371.27 370.99 369.29 368.68 371.89 371.96 367.03 129
(85.25) (88.38) (84.78) (85.67) (85.03) (88.12) (84.49)
Treatment 1 375.91 375.11 373.36 372.76 376.90 377.00 371.30 66
(75.05) (78.77) (75.96) (76.10) (74.59) (77.39) (75.66)
Treatment 2 366.41 366.68 365.01 364.41 366.65 366.69 362.56 63
(95.14) (97.91) (93.57) (95.11) (95.06) (98.47) (93.26)
t-stat diff. 0.631 0.540 0.558 0.552 0.683 0.663 0.586
TABLE 2 ￿ B) BAYESIAN INFORMATION CRITERION (STANDARD DEVIATION ARE IN PARENTHESIS)33
SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM Obs.
All -50.46 -52.40 -50.57 -50.93 -50.30 -50.85 -49.97 129
(18.90) (25.26) (20.11) (20.23) (18.98) (21.70) (20.06)
Treatment 1 -51.02 -51.93 -51.03 -51.36 -50.79 -51.24 -50.50 66
(18.50) (22.58) (20.06) (19.62) (18.63) (18.87) (19.77)
Treatment 2 -49.86 -52.89 -50.08 -50.47 -49.79 -50.43 -49.42 63
(19.44) (27.97) (20.31) (21.00) (19.47) (24.46) (20.50)
t-stat diff. -0.347 0.215 -0.267 -0.247 -0.299 -0.213 -0.304
TABLE 3￿AVERAGE PREDICTION LOG-LIKELIHOODS (STANDARD DEVIATION ARE IN PARENTHESIS)
Treatment 1
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
SEU (4) 0 0 0 0 0 15 85 6.85
CEU (8) 71 14 8 6 2 0 0 1.53
AEU (6) 5 50 30 5 5 3 3 2.76
NEU (5) 0 3 27 47 17 3 3 3.98
XEU (5) 0 0 14 9 39 29 9 5.11
VEU (5) 3 15 2 5 30 45 0 4.80
CM (6) 21 18 20 29 8 5 0 2.97
Treatment 2
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
SEU (4) 0 0 3 0 2 14 81 6.70
CEU (8) 56 29 8 5 3 0 0 1.71
AEU (6) 14 27 32 16 5 3 3 2.92
NEU (5) 0 3 21 40 24 10 3 4.25
XEU (5) 2 6 22 5 27 33 5 4.68
VEU (5) 2 21 2 11 29 35 2 4.56
CM (6) 27 14 13 24 11 5 6 3.17
TABLE 4￿RANKINGS BASED ON UNCORRECTED FITTED LOG-LIKELIHOODS (ALL VALUES REPRESENT PERCENT-
AGES)34
Treatment 1
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
EU (4) 24 17 6 11 18 24 0 3.55
CEU (8) 11 14 6 8 8 6 48 5.00
AEU (6) 9 18 24 3 18 23 5 3.89
NEU (5) 18 23 23 27 8 2 0 2.88
XEU (5) 6 6 12 23 23 14 17 4.58
VEU (5) 8 18 17 5 15 12 26 4.41
CM (6) 24 5 12 24 11 20 5 3.70
Treatment 2
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
EU (4) 21 16 11 19 17 16 0 3.44
CEU (8) 14 10 10 5 6 8 48 4.94
AEU (6) 10 16 19 11 13 25 6 4.03
NEU (5) 17 17 22 21 17 3 2 3.19
XEU (5) 6 16 14 17 14 19 13 4.25
VEU (5) 8 14 14 14 19 11 19 4.32
CM (6) 24 11 10 13 13 17 13 3.83
TABLE 5￿RANKINGS BASED ON FITTED LOG-LIKELIHOODS CORRECTED USING THE BAYESIAN INFORMATION
CRITERION (ALL VALUES REPRESENT PERCENTAGES)35
Treatment 1
Model EU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CEU 64 n.a. 6 9 21 33 8
AEU 55 0 n.a. 35 59 8 0
NEU 56 0 n.a. n.a. 3 11 n.a.
XEU 27 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 2 0
VEU 24 0 2 0 6 n.a. 0
CM 62 0 2 42 6 18 n.a.
Treatment 2
Model EU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CEU 57 n.a. 14 19 24 21 8
AEU 56 0 n.a. 32 56 3 0
NEU 48 0 n.a. n.a. 6 3 n.a.
XEU 32 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 2 0
VEU 25 0 5 3 10 n.a. 2
CM 60 0 13 60 16 14 n.a.
TABLE 6￿SIGNIFICANCE TESTS AT 5 PERCENT (RESULTS FROM THE CLARKE TEST ARE IN BOLD)
Treatment 1
Model EU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CEU 48 n.a. 5 6 9 9 5
AEU 42 0 n.a. 20 45 5 0
NEU 42 0 n.a. n.a. 2 5 n.a
XEU 15 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0
VEU 14 0 2 0 3 n.a. 0
CM 50 0 0 33 0 9 n.a.
Treatment 2
Model EU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
EU n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
CEU 48 n.a. 11 10 16 10 5
AEU 48 0 n.a. 30 33 0 0
NEU 33 0 n.a. n.a. 2 2 n.a.
XEU 25 0 n.a. 0 n.a. 0 0
VEU 10 0 5 3 6 n.a. 2
CM 48 0 10 48 8 11 n.a.
TABLE 7￿SIGNIFICANCE TESTS AT 1 PERCENT (RESULTS FROM THE CLARKE TEST ARE IN BOLD)36
Treatment 1
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
EU 8 20 6 20 8 24 15 4.33
CEU 21 20 11 5 15 5 24 3.83
AEU 18 8 20 8 15 23 9 3.98
NEU 8 11 18 26 18 9 11 4.06
XEU 11 12 17 11 20 15 15 4.23
VEU 8 12 17 17 14 14 20 4.36
CM 27 18 12 15 11 11 7 3.20
Treatment 2
Model 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Average Ranking
EU 8 17 6 13 24 21 11 4.33
CEU 22 13 10 5 6 10 35 4.29
AEU 14 22 13 14 22 14 0 3.51
NEU 5 17 22 19 17 6 13 3.97
XEU 8 16 14 10 14 19 19 4.40
VEU 17 10 24 11 6 17 14 3.89
CM 25 5 11 29 10 13 8 3.62
TABLE 8￿A) RANKING BASED ON PREDICTION LOG-LIKELIHOODS (ALL VALUES REPRESENT PERCENTAGES)
Average Rankings SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
Treatment 1 4.33 3.83 3.98 4.06 4.23 4.36 3.20
Treatment 2 4.33 4.29 3.51 3.97 4.40 3.89 3.62
TABLE 8 ￿ B) AVERAGE RANKINGS BASED ON PREDICTION LOG-LIKELIHOODS
% of subjects for whom best SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
Treatment 1 8 21 18 8 11 8 27
Treatment 2 8 22 14 5 8 17 25
TABLE 8 ￿ C) MODELS FIRST IN THE RANKING FOR PREDICTION
SEU CEU AEU NEU XEU VEU CM
All 14.75 24.00 12.34 14.26 14.18 13.33 8.13
Treatment 1 13.17 23.18 10.89 13.24 12.41 13.53 7.73
Treatment 2 16.42 24.87 13.85 15.32 16.07 13.13 8.54
TABLE 9￿AVERAGE DEPARTURE FROM BEST PREDICTION37
Treatment 1
SEU (24%) CEU (11%) AEU (9%) NEU (18%) XEU (6%) VEU (8%) CM (24%)
SEU 3.75 4.14 5.00 4.67 4.75 4.40 4.38
CEU 3.75 5.57 4.00 3.33 2.75 4.20 3.63
AEU 4.25 2.71 3.00 4.00 4.75 5.00 4.13
NEU 4.19 4.00 4.00 4.08 2.75 3.00 4.63
XEU 4.38 4.00 3.67 4.17 6.50 3.60 4.06
VEU 4.00 4.14 4.50 4.25 5.00 4.20 4.75
CM 3.69 3.43 3.83 3.50 1.50 3.60 2.44
Treatment 2
SEU (21%) CEU (14%) AEU (10%) NEU (17%) XEU (6%) VEU (8%) CM (24%)
SEU 4.54 3.89 4.67 3.55 3.75 5.20 4.73
CEU 5.46 4.56 3.17 4.82 3.75 2.80 3.80
AEU 2.54 3.56 3.33 4.27 3.75 4.20 3.53
NEU 3.77 4.11 4.50 4.45 2.75 3.80 3.87
XEU 3.62 4.44 3.33 4.27 5.50 5.60 4.87
VEU 4.23 3.00 4.33 2.82 4.25 3.20 4.87
CM 3.85 4.44 4.67 3.82 4.25 3.20 2.33
TABLE 10￿AVERAGE RANKING ON PREDICTION OF THE ROW MODEL WHEN THE COLUMN MODEL FITS THE BEST
Treatment 1
SEU (24%) CEU (11%) AEU (9%) NEU (18%) XEU (6%) VEU (8%) CM (24%)
SEU 6.25 6.49 18.12 5.29 7.91 15.33 8.89
CEU 6.96 8.21 17.15 6.44 7.85 25.69 9.54
AEU 6.53 6.22 5.97 5.24 7.94 16.15 8.99
NEU 6.54 6.75 16.99 5.27 7.13 16.11 9.21
XEU 6.30 6.32 18.80 5.21 8.61 15.52 8.70
VEU 6.30 6.43 18.68 5.10 7.95 21.08 9.54
CM 6.30 6.60 6.96 5.17 6.60 16.13 8.15
Treatment 2
SEU (21%) CEU (14%) AEU (10%) NEU (17%) XEU (6%) VEU (8%) CM (24%)
SEU 10.39 5.07 25.61 7.19 17.42 6.35 10.76
CEU 15.67 6.94 15.12 10.78 15.54 8.48 10.12
AEU 10.90 5.09 26.65 6.99 17.26 6.20 10.69
NEU 10.52 5.31 26.59 7.02 16.98 6.13 11.60
XEU 10.87 4.94 33.38 7.22 20.66 6.35 10.74
VEU 12.30 4.92 29.51 7.00 17.67 6.02 11.48
CM 10.23 5.21 15.28 6.83 13.71 5.92 9.14
TABLE 11￿ACTUAL VS PREDICTED ALLOCATION OF THE ROW MODEL WHEN THE COLUMN MODEL FITS THE BEST38
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FIGURE 3. PAIRWISE COMPARISON FITTED (CORRECTED BIC) LOG-LIKELIHOODS: SEU VS OTHER THEORIES